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Deteriorating Employment and Marriage Decline in Japan
Shigeki Matsuda, Takayuki Sasaki
Abstract: As is the case in Western countries, more Japanese are marrying later or 
remaining unmarried and are postponing childbearing or staying childless. Previ-
ous studies revealed that those individuals who were unable to secure regular em-
ployment due to the serious recession between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, la-
belled a “lost generation,” had a very low marriage rate. But what about subsequent 
cohorts? Using a discrete-time logit model to analyse Japanese Life Course Panel 
Survey data, this study investigates the effects of employment on fi rst marriages 
between 2007 and 2015, including cohorts after the lost generation. The results indi-
cate that: (a) among men who are classed as non-regular employees, unemployed, 
or low-income regular employees, the likelihood of fi rst marriage is low due to their 
weak economic position; and (b) women have a low likelihood of fi rst marriage if 
they are non-regular employees or unemployed, not because of their employment 
status but because they have less chance of meeting a romantic partner and also 
because of their values regarding work and marriage. These explicit gender differ-
ences in the fi ndings contradict observations made in contemporary Europe and 
North America, where a trend towards gender convergence in the effects of em-
ployment and earnings on marriage has been identifi ed. The ambivalence towards 
gender equality in family and the workplace will be discussed to understand why 
many young Japanese remain single.
Keywords: Marriage · Low fertility · Employment · Romantic partner · Values
1 Introduction
During the last half century, there have been dramatic changes in family formation 
behaviour in most developed countries. As is the case in Western countries, more 
Japanese are marrying later or remaining unmarried and are postponing childbear-
ing or staying childless. According to census data, the mean age at fi rst marriage 
was 26.9 for men and 24.2 for women in 1970, with the fi gures jumping to 31.1 for 
men and 29.4 for women in 2015. In 1970, 11.7 percent of men and 7.2 percent of 
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women aged 30 to 34 years had never been married. By 2015, those numbers had 
reached 47.1 percent and 34.6 percent respectively. In the mid-1970s, the Japanese 
total fertility rate (TFR) sank below replacement level and has remained low ever 
since. In 2005, this fi gure reached a record low of 1.26. It recovered slightly the 
following year but has now plateaued at 1.36 as of 2019. Unlike Western countries, 
however, premarital cohabitation and extra-marital childbirths have not become 
common among Japanese. The percentage of childbirths outside marriage in Japan 
is only 2 percent, and is signifi cantly lower than the OECD average of 40 percent in 
2016 (OECD family database 2018). In Japan, strong social norms link marriage with 
childbirth (Ochiai 2013), and cohabitation or out-of-wedlock births are not accepted 
as valid alternatives to the institution of marriage, as is the case in Western coun-
tries (Raymo et al. 2015). It is therefore important to examine whether factors asso-
ciated with the retreat from marriage among Japanese are similar/dissimilar to what 
has been found in other countries. There are multiple factors that determine the 
timing of marriage. Among them, the individual economic circumstances of young 
people have been found to be associated with family formation. As the economic 
power of women rises, however, the opportunity costs of marriage and parenting 
would increase. 
The purpose of the present study is to investigate whether existing theories in 
the West can apply to Japan, where social and cultural backgrounds are different. 
The signifi cance of targeting Japan for this research is as follows. First, Japan is un-
dergoing a rapid trend toward late marriage that is linked closely to the circumstance 
of youth employment. Since the burst of the bubble economy in the 1990s, unique 
employment practices in Japan have caused employment conditions to deteriorate, 
especially for young people. In addition, unlike Western countries, the traditional 
gender role of women in the home (bearing responsibility for housework and child-
care) is still emphasised in Japan. We will shed light on the nature of marital process 
differences by focusing on employment practices and gender equality both in the 
family and at the workplace. Specifi cally, we examine how unstable jobs and low 
economic resources affect marriage timing among Japanese men and women, and 
discuss why gender differences, if there are any, exist.
1.1 Theoretical considerations 
In Western countries, economic circumstances have long been identifi ed as an im-
portant predictor of family formation (Thornton et al. 2007) as a secure fi nancial 
foundation is one of the conditions that young people need before starting family 
formation. When their income level falls due to recession, their marriage timing 
tends to be delayed (Sobotka et al. 2011). The timing of a couple’s marriage is af-
fected in particular by the man’s income level. Indeed, a large body of literature has 
almost universally highlighted that men’s economic resources, such as earnings 
and employment status, are strong predictors of a transition to fi rst marriage in 
Europe (Blossfeld et al. 2005; Kalmijn 2011), in the United States (Burstein 2007; 
McClendon et al. 2014), in Israel (Raz-Yurovich 2010) and in Egypt (Salem 2016). In 
East Asian countries, economic stagnation and growing economic inequality fol-
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lowing the Asian economic crisis in the 2000s was one of the factors that delayed 
family formation among the younger generation, especially those at the low end of 
the socioeconomic spectrum (Raymo et al. 2015). 
Women’s economic circumstances have a much more complex impact on mar-
riage. According to Becker’s theoretical model of marriage (1973, 1981), individuals 
are assumed to rationally choose whether or not to marry based on the gain that 
can be maximised from the decision. Thus, women’s economic independence could 
discourage women from entering into marriage because marriage and parenthood 
would increase their opportunity costs. Oppenheimer (1988, 1994) questioned this 
economic perspective and found that highly educated women may delay marriage 
to pursue their own careers but are more likely to fi nd potential partners. In other 
words, women with economic resources were not expected to forego marriage but 
postpone it. 
Empirical results in Western countries often showed that the link between wom-
en’s economic resources and marriage had been negative in older cohorts (Burgess 
et al. 2003), but has become positive for more recent cohorts (Kuo/Raley 2016; Sch-
neider et al. 2019). The magnitude of this association is, however, relatively weak 
compared with that for men (Burstein 2007; Shafer/James 2013). One explanation 
for this dramatic turnaround is related closely to a social trajectory towards gen-
der equality. If women were not provided with opportunities equivalent to those 
of men in education and the labour market, marriage would be less attractive for 
highly educated women with a promising career. As Inglehart and his colleagues 
(Inglehart/Baker 2000; Inglehartet al. 2002) and Lesthaeghe (1983) predicted, we 
have witnessed that beliefs regarding gender roles have become more egalitarian, 
life course decisions have been subject to individual needs as well as weakening 
social and institutional constraints, and the division of labour has become less gen-
dered than in the past. In such egalitarian settings, the costs of family formation 
can be shared between both men and women. Furthermore, those who have stable 
employment and earnings, regardless of gender, may possess stronger marriage-
ability. This rationale has been supported by cross-national studies (Blossfeld 1995; 
Ono 2003). In countries with a large gender gap, women’s economic resources have 
been found to decrease the likelihood of marital transition. In contrast, women’s 
economic resources have been found to increase the likelihood of marital transi-
tion in countries where gender roles are less rigid. Matsuda (2019) compared the 
relationship between marital status and employment conditions among men in six 
countries using cross-sectional data (Japan, Korea, Singapore, UK, France, and 
Sweden), and found that non-regular employment, low income, and unemployment 
are associated with being unmarried. The magnitude of the association was much 
stronger in Asia, especially in Japan, than in Europe. This fi nding suggests that 
persistent social norms about male breadwinning roles are deeply instilled among 
Japanese. Considering that gender disparity in Japan is among the highest in the 
world (World Economic Forum 2019), the process of transition to marriage is ex-
pected to differ depending on gender.
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1.2 Labour market and marriage in the japanese context
Traditionally, Japanese companies simultaneously hired new graduates once a year 
in accordance with a Japanese employment practice that emphasised seniority-
based promotion and lifetime employment. Due to the collapse of the bubble econ-
omy in the early 1990s, however, Japanese companies were forced to change this 
practice in order to reduce labour costs. Because the Labour Standards Law re-
stricts employee dismissal for the purpose of reorganisation, many Japanese com-
panies limited the number of young regular employees hired during the recession 
(Genda 2004). In response to labour market conditions, employment regulations be-
came more fl exible, and the number of non-regular employees increased. In 1990, 
the share of workers aged between 25 and 34 who were non-regular employees 
stood at just 3.2 percent for men and 28.2 percent for women, before soaring to 
16.6 percent for men and 40.9 percent for women in 2015 (Japan Cabinet Offi ce 
2019). Non-regular employees receive signifi cantly lower wages than regular em-
ployees and have fewer chances of obtaining regular employment status due to the 
very low level of career mobility in Japan. Japanese companies continued to hire 
regular employees through the bulk recruitment of new graduates and minimised 
mid-career recruitment (Kosugi 2010).
Furthermore, regular employees’ income has decreased since the 1990s. In 1997, 
the percentage of regular employees with annual incomes of less than three million 
yen was 43 percent among workers in their 20s and 11 percent among those in their 
30s, but these fi gures had increased to 50 percent and 19 percent respectively a 
decade later (Matsuda 2013). Brinton (2011) called this change in employment con-
dition “lost in transition” as the increase in non-regular employees and a decline in 
income made it diffi cult for Japanese young people to transition to a stable career 
and marriage. Considering these unique conditions in the Japanese labour market, 
the present study tests “the employment deterioration hypothesis” (Matsuda 2019, 
2020), which posits that deteriorated employment conditions due to globalisation, 
service industrialisation, and industrial sophistication result in lower marriage rates. 
It is important to disentangle the impact of income and employment status although 
both refl ect employment deterioration. Earnings emphasise the fi nancial aspects of 
employment, with a focus on whether individuals are able to fulfi l the role of pro-
vider. On the other hand, employment status encompasses a vague sense of uncer-
tainty about the future because non-regular employees often lack proper social se-
curity protection and conversion to the status of regular employees is rare in Japan. 
Raymo et al. (2015) argues that the tension between rapid changes in the socio-
economic spheres and limited changes within the family sphere underlies the hesi-
tation for family formation in East Asia. Japanese women’s labour participation rate 
in 2017 was 67.4 percent, above the OECD average and even higher than that of US 
and France. However, almost half of fi rst-time mothers who held a job before preg-
nancy quit their job following the birth of a child while their husbands remained part 
of the labour force during the transition to parenthood (NIPSSR 2016). Many moth-
ers return to the labour market after several years of parenting but in the form of 
non-regular employment. While the employment rate of women increased, women 
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are also often responsible for the lion’s share of housework and childcare. In Japan, 
where gender roles are highly asymmetric, female hypergamy remains strong be-
cause there are social and institutional constraints that limit women’s opportunities 
(Jones et al. 2009; Raymo et al. 2015). When never-married individuals are asked 
what they look for in marriage partners, a large gender difference emerges in that 
twice as many women as men consider earnings, occupation, and academic back-
ground when selecting a potential partner (NIPSSR 2016).
Several attempts have been made to clarify the temporal context in Japan using 
longitudinal data. Men’s fi rst jobs and women’s education have often found to be 
linked to their fi rst marriage. Sakai and Higuchi (2005) used the retrospective data 
from the fi rst wave of the Keio Household Panel Survey and showed that both men 
and women who were unemployed or had a non-regular job one year after complet-
ing their education were less likely to get married or more likely to delay their fi rst 
marriage. This trend was especially true for those who graduated after 1992. Tsuya 
(2011) studied a sample of individuals born between 1955 and 1986 and found that 
the likelihood of fi rst marriage was low among men whose fi rst job was non-regular 
and women whose educational level was high. When looking at a sample born be-
tween 1935 and 1954, however, men’s employment status was not a predictor of 
the likelihood of fi rst marriage (Tsuya 2018). This suggests that men’s employment 
status at their fi rst job has a stronger impact on family formation among the younger 
cohorts.
In addition to the fi rst job, individuals’ work history has found to be associated 
with family formation. Using detailed life history data of a cohort born between 
1966 and 1980, Sasaki (2012) investigated how the effects of individuals’ employ-
ment status on their fi rst marriage changed as they age. The results revealed that 
men who were unemployed, self-employed, or non-regularly employed in the pre-
vious year were far less likely to get married than regularly employed individuals; 
the gap was especially wide when the men were in their late 20s and early 30s. 
Using the same data, Mugiyama (2017) discovered that transition to fi rst marriage 
occurred less frequently among both men and women when one consistently had 
a non-regular job in the previous three years. Piotrowski et al. (2015) analysed an-
other set of retrospective life history data of a cohort born between 1970 and 1973 
and found that having a non-regular job hampered family formation even after fi ve 
years, and that the effect for men is much stronger than for women.
Overall, existing studies have provided evidence that the likelihood of fi rst mar-
riage is signifi cantly low if Japanese men have a non-regular job, regardless of when 
it occurred in his work history. Historically, Japanese women’s employment condi-
tions seem to play a less vital role in determining marriage, but studies with more 
recent cohorts suggest a possible increase in the impact of women’s employment 
on fi rst marriage ( Mugiyama 2017; Piotrowski et al. 2015; Sasaki 2012). However, 
these studies were based on retrospective data; subjective data as well as objective 
data that are hard to recall were therefore not collected. One exception is a study 
conducted by Fukuda (2007), who used prospective data with a female sample born 
between 1960 and 1983. Although he did not include employment status in the 
model, he found that women whose annual income is around the national average 
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are most likely to get married, compared with other women. This study may be 
indicative of the changing gender roles in Japan, but this is unknown without com-
paring men and women.
The present study makes a major contribution to the literature by investigating 
the effects of employment on fi rst marriage in Japan, for both men and women, us-
ing prospective longitudinal data collected annually since 2007. Through this data, 
we can test whether the nature of the relationship between employment and fi rst 
marriage has remained the same in recent years by considering important predict-
ing factors such as annual income, the presence of a signifi cant other, and values 
about work and marriage. And more importantly, how social and cultural contexts 
would affect family formation will be discussed.
1.3 Research questions
RQ 1: Is the likelihood of fi rst marriage low among men and women who have a 
regular job if their income is low?
Whereas extensive research has shown robust fi ndings that employment status 
has a major infl uence on family formation, it is still unclear whether employment 
status per se can give rise to a decision to get married, since the nature of employ-
ment status is multifaceted. Non-regular employees may feel insecure about their 
future due to their uncertain career path and low income with few opportunities for 
pay rises, which may lead them to remaining unmarried. While it is true that the pro-
portion of non-regular employment has increased dramatically in recent decades, 
and with it the percentage of never-married men and women, this explains only 
part of the causal relationship. Although the proportion of non-regular employees 
among young men has undoubtedly risen sharply in the last quarter of a century, 
the fi gure remains at just 16.6 percent for men in 2015. Given that regular employ-
ees’ income has fallen in that same period in Japan, regular employees with a low 
annual income may feel that they are unable to fulfi l a providing role even though 
their job status instils a sense of security thanks to permanent employment con-
tracts and welfare benefi ts.
The division of labour by gender is often rigid among Japanese married couples, 
especially after the birth of their fi rst child. Because there is a strong expectation on 
Japanese men to play the role of breadwinner, those men who lack economic re-
sources are less likely to be chosen as a potential husband. In cross-sectional data, 
an annual income of three million yen has been found to be a clean-cut threshold 
as to whether a man will marry (Japan Cabinet Offi ce 2011; Matsuda 2019, 2020), 
but the effect of income on marriage for women is not well known because many 
married Japanese women have already withdrawn from the labour market. The pro-
spective nature of the present study allows us to test whether the effects of earn-
ing power on fi rst marriage differ by gender even after the effects of employment 
status are controlled.
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RQ2: Is the likelihood of fi rst marriage low among men and women who have an 
unstable job because they have less chance of encountering a potential spouse?
Traditionally, Japanese marriages were facilitated by an arrangement of families, 
kin, or matchmakers rather than by love or mutual attraction. It is only in recent 
decades that a majority of young men and women have been able to choose their 
own partner. At the same time, the lack of a suitable partner) has continuously been 
cited as the primary reason why Japanese young men and women remain unmar-
ried (NIPSSR 2016). Oppenheimer (1988) argues that individuals look for potential 
spouses until they fi nd one who satisfi es the minimum qualifi cations needed to 
have an acceptable married life. Using a name generator approach to assess per-
sonal networks, Matsuda (2015) found that the proportion of regular employees in 
a respondent’s daily contacts was much smaller if respondents themselves were 
non-regular employees, and non-regular employees were less likely to have a ro-
mantic partner than those individuals who were regularly employed. This suggests 
that individuals with unstable employment are not only less likely to marry, but also 
that their chances of meeting a romantic partner are smaller.
A deterioration in the employment situation due to macroeconomic conditions 
greatly reduces the absolute number of available single men who can afford to fulfi l 
the role of provider. This may have a major impact on women with a precarious job 
because the chance to meet a potential marital partner with a stable employment 
status within the range of daily contacts is small (Matsuda 2015). The present study 
investigates whether the effects of employment status on fi rst marriage would be 
sustained, even after controlling for the presence of a romantic partner to test if the 
mate selection process is different for men and women.
RQ3: Do attitudes towards work and/or marriage predict the likelihood of fi rst mar-
riage among men and women?
Attitudes and values are important mechanisms affecting individual life events, 
including employment, marriage, and childbirth (Easterlin 1980; van de Kaa 1987; 
Lesthaeghe 2002, 2010). Ajzen and his colleagues (Ajzen 2012; Ajzen/Kobas 2013; 
Fishbein/Ajzen 1975) built a theoretical framework to delineate how attitudes to-
wards a particular behaviour, along with social pressure, predict intentions and how 
intentions then predict behaviour. Barber et al. (2002) empirically tested the frame-
work and found that positive attitudes towards marriage and childbearing lead to 
earlier family formation. They also found that positive attitudes towards educational 
attainment and career pursuits have a negative impact on family formation because 
these individuals see a confl ict between their career or educational goals on the one 
hand and the requirements of a family on the other. Although eight waves of a lon-
gitudinal study were used for the analysis above, neither the effects of employment 
status nor income level were included in the model. This study will examine to what 
extent attitudes regarding work and/or marriage affect the decision to marry, after 
considering the effects of employment conditions. 
The vast majority (around 90 percent) of never-married Japanese men and wom-
en have continuously reported that they intended to marry at some point in the 
future (NIPSSR 2016), but fewer and fewer Japanese are actually able to fulfi l this 
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wish. This implies that personal as well as contextual obstacles prevent them from 
enacting their intended goal (i.e. marriage). Given that family obligations and expec-
tations are still strong in Japan, the opportunity cost of marriage is high, especially 
for economically independent women (Bumpass et al. 2009). Similarly, attitudes 
towards work and/or marriage may act differently for men and women and the as-
sociation may differ depending on individuals’ employment stability.
RQ4: Have the effects of employment status on fi rst marriage persisted over recent 
years?
In addition to individual employment conditions, macro-level economic condi-
tions can exert an infl uence on family formation (Sobotka et al. 2011). In particular, 
men and women whose position in the labour market is precarious are likely to forgo 
or postpone family formation during economic recession (Blossfeld/Mills 2005). In 
Japan, those who entered the labour market between the mid-1990s, when Japan’s 
bubble economy burst, and the mid-2000s are often labelled as the “lost genera-
tion” (Asahi-Shimbun “Lost Generation” Shuzai-han 2007) given the extreme dif-
fi culty experienced by these individuals in fi nding a regular job in the deteriorating 
labour market. Increasing numbers of young people had to settle for non-regular 
jobs with low income, leading to their economic dependence on ageing parents 
as well as to delayed marriages (Brinton 2011). As mentioned above, the existing 
body of empirical research using Japanese longitudinal data (e.g. Mugiyama 2017; 
Piotrowski et al. 2015; Sasaki 2012; Tsuya 2011, 2018) focused on the relationship 
between employment and marriage in the 1990s and established that non-regu-
lar employees were less likely than regular employees to marry, particularly in the 
case of men. However, whether such fi ndings continued to remain valid through the 
2010s requires further investigation. After the fi nancial crisis in 2008, the Japanese 
economy was relatively stable. Thus, the present study aims to examine the effects 
of young adults’ employment conditions on their marriage status in post-economic 
recession Japan using prospective longitudinal data.
2 Methods
2.1 Data
The data used for this study are derived from the Japanese Life Course Panel Sur-
vey (JLPS) conducted by the Institute of Social Science at the University of Tokyo. A 
nationally representative sample of men and women aged between 20 and 40 years 
in 2007 was asked about the timing of their major life events, including education, 
employment, and family formation, as well as their attitudes and values towards 
such events. Individuals have since been followed on an annual basis. This study 
is based on the fi rst nine waves of their ongoing panel study. Men and women 
aged between 20 and 34 years who were unmarried at wave 1 in 2007 (926 men 
and 861 women) were the focus of the present study. By examining this sample, 
we can investigate the mechanisms of family formation in Japan for both men and 
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women among more recent cohorts than those used in previous studies. Existing 
Japanese research examining marital union retrospectively collected the detailed 
life course trajectories, including academic background and work history; however, 
it is diffi cult to assess circumstantiated states, thoughts, and beliefs in the past. 
Thus, another important strength of this data is that pivotal time-variant predictors, 
such as annual income and attitudes and values towards marriage and work, can be 
incorporated into the analysis. 
2.2 Measures
The dependent variable in the present analysis is a dichotomous indicator equal to 
1 if a respondent experienced their fi rst marriage in the survey year, and 0 other-
wise. Employment status is our primary independent variable of interest and is cat-
egorised into four different employment statuses: regular employment, non-regular 
employment, self-employed, and not in the labour force. Regular employment is a 
permanent employee with no fi xed term of employment. Typical employment sta-
tuses for non-regular employment include part-time workers, contract workers, dis-
patched workers and temporary workers, and their term of employment is normally 
fi xed. Given that income is decreasing even among those who have a regular job, 
and those whose annual income is less than three million yen are likely to remain 
unmarried (Japan Cabinet Offi ce 2011; Matsuda 2019, 2020), it is important to dis-
tinguish between regularly employed individuals whose income is high and those 
whose income is low. We therefore use three million yen as a cut-off point for the 
following analysis. 
Each year, respondents are asked whether they have an ongoing romantic part-
ner, which is used to create a dummy variable representing the presence of a ro-
mantic partner. Attitudes towards work and marriage are assessed biannually by 
asking to what extent “success in work” (= importance of work) and “marrying and 
living a happy family life” (= importance of married life) are important to respond-
ents on a three-point scale (1 = very important, 2 = a little important, 3 = not impor-
tant). The values are reverse-coded so the higher scores represent a higher degree 
of importance. Data are complemented by entering the same value with one wave 
ahead. Respondents’ age, age-squared (centred by men’s and women’s age sepa-
rately) and educational attainment are also included as control variables.
2.3 Analysis strategy
Discrete-time event history analysis will be conducted to estimate the conditional 
probability of marriage occurring, given that it has not yet done so. We set 2007, 
wave 1 of the survey, as the beginning of the observation and examine how the haz-
ard rate depends on time (survey year) and the explanatory variables. Alternatively, 
one could set a certain age as a starting point of the risk period. However, the age 
range of the current sample was 20 to 34 at wave 1 and no information is available 
before those ages, except several time-invariant variables including last school at-
tended, fi rst job, and childhood conditions and so forth. We give more priority to 
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examining the effects of time-variant variables on marriage than to examining the 
age at which marriage is likely to happen. For the time-varying explanatory vari-
ables, a two-year lag will be given. Piotrowski et al. (2015) compared the robustness 
of different lags from zero to fi ve years using a Japanese sample and found that the 
two-year lag fi t the model well. This is quite reasonable considering the marital situ-
ation in Japan, where it often takes more than a year for a marriage to be completed 
after the decision to marry is made. Some people go through multiple rituals and 
ceremonies that involve both the husband’s and wife’s families. Logit function will 
be used for the parameter estimation. We adjusted their standard errors using a 
heteroscedastic robust procedure (White 1980).
3 Results
Descriptive statistics for variables used separately in the analysis for men and wom-
en are shown in Table 1. The event of fi rst marriage occurred for 9 percent of men 
and 16 percent of women between wave 1 and wave 9. The mean age at the time of 
the fi rst marriage was 29.5 for men and 28.3 for women. The breakdown of the most 
important explanatory variable, namely the employment status for men was as fol-
lows: 60 percent were regular employees, 17 percent were non-regular employees, 
17 percent were not part of the labour force, and less than one percent were self-
employed. The percentage of male regular employees who earn three million yen 
or more and those who earn less than three million yen was about the same (29 per-
cent vs 32 percent). On the other hand, the proportion of female regular employees 
whose annual income is three million yen or more was much smaller than that of 
men (17 percent) even though there was no salient difference in the percentage of 
regular employment by gender. The proportion of non-regular employment among 
women was much higher than that among men (27 percent vs 17 percent), which in-
dicates that men’s employment position is more stable than women’s. With regard 
to the presence of a romantic partner, another important independent variable, the 
proportion was 28 percent for men and 42 percent for women. There was no signifi -
cant gender difference in mean values as far as the importance of work and married 
life are concerned.
Table 2 presents the results of the discrete-time event history analysis for men 
estimating fi rst marriage. Model 1 shows the effect of employment status after con-
trolling for educational attainment. Compared with regular employees (= reference 
group), the hazard-odds ratio of fi rst marriage for self-employed individuals in any 
given year was not signifi cantly different, but it was 0.44 times less for non-regular 
employees and 0.14 times less for those who were not in the labour force. The 
results of Model 2, which divided regular employees into two groups by annual 
income, show that regular employees with annual income of less than three million 
yen had a signifi cantly lower likelihood of fi rst marriage compared with regular em-
ployees with annual income of three million yen or above (= reference group); the 
hazard-odds ratio of the former was about half that of the latter. In addition, com-
pared with the results of Model 1, the hazard-odds ratio of non-regular employees 
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decreased. This indicates that the low likelihood of fi rst marriage of non-regular 
employees is not only due to their unstable employment situation but also their low 
income level. 
The presence of a romantic partner was added in Model 3, and greatly increased 
the likelihood of fi rst marriage. Of all the independent variables, the presence of a 
romantic partner had the greatest effect on whether marriage actually occurred. 
What should be noted in this model was that factors such as individuals who are 
regular employees with annual income of less than three million yen, non-regular 
employees and those not in the labour force continued to have signifi cant effects on 
marriage rates even after controlling for the presence of a romantic partner. 
Individual attitudes towards work and marriage were added in Model 4. While 
attitudes that emphasise career goals signifi cantly reduced the likelihood of mar-
riage, the attitudes emphasising married life led to a distinct increase in the chances 
of getting married. Placing importance on marital life had a stronger effect on the 
fi rst marriage than placing importance on career goals. The effects of employment 
status remained signifi cant and the coeffi cients did not change much after control-
ling for the presence of a romantic partner and attitudes towards occupational life 
and married life. 
Table 3 shows the results for women. Although the magnitude of the effects 
was relatively small compared with the results for men, the hazard-odds ratio of 
fi rst marriage for non-regular employees and those not in the labour force was sig-
nifi cantly lower than that of regular employees. This is consistent with fi ndings in 
the West (e.g. Burstein 2007; Shafer/James 2013) and in line with Oppenheimer’s 
argument (1988, 1994) that women’s economic resources should increase marriage 
probability. Unlike men, however, the difference between regular employment with 
annual income at or over three million yen versus income that is less caused no 
signifi cant difference in the probability of fi rst marriage for women (Model 2). That 
is, there is no signifi cant difference in the probability based on the level of income 
among regular employees. The hazard-odds ratio for non-regular employees and 
those not in the labour force in Model 2 are almost the same as those in Model 1, 
suggesting that income level has little impact on marriage for women. In addition, 
women’s educational level was not signifi cant (albeit junior technical college gradu-
ates were less likely than high school graduates to marry in Model 2). Taken to-
gether, women’s educational attainment and economic power were not linked to 
marriage in Japan, which contradicts contemporary fi ndings in the West. 
Similar to men’s results, the presence of a romantic partner signifi cantly in-
creased the occurrence of fi rst marriage, and its effect was the most signifi cant 
variable for women as well (Model 3). However, a gender difference did emerge in 
the results of employment status. For women, the signifi cant difference between 
regular employees with a high level of income and non-regular employees in terms 
of the likelihood of marriage disappeared after controlling for the presence of a 
romantic partner. The effect of attitudes on the likelihood of fi rst marriage among 
women was similar to the results obtained for men in Model 4. Again, there was a 
signifi cant gender difference. The effects of employment status remained signifi -
cant for men whereas none of the different types of employment status was signifi -
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cant after controlling for the presence of a romantic partner and attitudes toward 
work life and married life among women. Additionally, age was the decisive factor 
in fi rst marriage likelihood for women, but not for men.
To test these gender differences, samples were pooled and interactions between 
each variable and gender were estimated (table not shown). For men, employment 
status and income were signifi cantly linked to marriage , but this was not the case 
for women. While the presence of a romantic partner had a signifi cant effect on mar-
riage for both men and women, the magnitude was signifi cantly stronger among 
men. The effects of attitudes towards work and marital life were not statistically 
different by gender. Neither did the effects of attitudes vary by employment status. 
We also tested if there is a period effect by entering interaction terms between each 
variable and risk period (i.e. survey year), but none of them was signifi cant. 
4 Discussion and conclusions
The present study investigates the effects of employment for both men and women 
on the likelihood of their fi rst marriage in Japan using prospective longitudinal data. 
The answers to the four research questions are as follows. First, the likelihood of 
fi rst marriage is low if men’s income is less than three million yen, even when they 
are regularly employed (RQ1). This fi nding is not observed among women. This 
study confi rms that men’s earning power, even after controlling for employment 
status, is an important determinant for marriage in Japan where there is a rigid divi-
sion of gender roles. For Japanese men, having a stable job is not enough to get 
married but being able to fulfi l the role of the breadwinner is critical.
With respect to RQ2, there is a signifi cant gender difference. For men, economic 
diffi culties are the reason why a deterioration in employment will affect whether 
or not they marry. Regardless of the presence of a romantic partner, the likelihood 
of marriage among men without a stable job and higher income is remarkably low. 
For women, in contrast, no matter how much they earn and irrespective of whether 
their employment status is regular or non-regular, there is no statistically signifi -
cant difference in the likelihood of marriage after controlling for the presence of a 
romantic partner. This suggests that opportunities to meet potential partners with a 
regular employment status and a high level of income are limited if women have an 
unstable job. Because individuals in non-regular employment have a smaller share 
of regular employees in their daily contacts (Matsuda 2015), it is more diffi cult for 
women than for men to meet their potential marital partners who satisfy marriage 
conditions (i.e. higher income and stable employment).
The third research question sought to examine the effects of attitudes on mar-
riage. Similar to the fi ndings of Barber et al. (2002), this study reveals that individual 
work-oriented attitudes reduce the likelihood of fi rst marriage, while married life-
oriented attitudes increase the likelihood of fi rst marriage. Given that both effects 
are very strong for men and women, it seems that an individual can achieve a life 
course that suits their values to some extent. However, the results give a distinctive 
insight for each gender. Whereas men’s employment conditions remain a strong 
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determinant of marriage, women’s employment conditions are no longer signifi cant 
after the presence of a romantic partner and their attitudes are considered. For 
women, willingness to give up career success and willingness to form a warm family 
environment (mainly by providing a caring role) are more important than fi nancial 
contribution to the family for marital union. This matches earlier observations that 
there is less of an emphasis on the fi nancial contribution to a household among 
women than there is among men. 
The answer to RQ4 is apparent among men. In line with previous studies, the 
negative impact on family formation of having an unstable job has persisted in 
young adults from those who married in the 1990s up until the 2010s. Data from sev-
eral sources have indicated that macro-level economic conditions can exert an infl u-
ence on family formation, especially for those who have an unstable job (Blossfeld/
Mills 2005; Sobotka et al. 2011). It is quite possible that marriage-inhibiting effects 
of precarious jobs could have weakened given that the Japanese economy was rela-
tively stable in the 2010s. Because current data only cover marriages that took place 
between 2007 and 2015, we are not able to test directly whether the effects of em-
ployment status changed when compared with the 1990s. However, the likelihood 
among non-regular employees and those not in the labour force compared with 
regular employees in this study (the magnitude of the coeffi cient) was almost the 
same as the result of previous studies focusing mainly on marriage in the 1990s and 
2000s using different samples (Sasaki 2012). In terms of its extent, therefore, the 
low likelihood of men in non-regular employment and those not in the labour force 
actually transitioning to marriage did not change very much until the mid-2010s. 
At the same time, however, whether the effects of women’s employment on mar-
riage have changed over time is unclear. Previous Japanese studies often found that 
the likelihood of marriage among women who have university degrees or a higher 
qualifi cation is small (Mugiyama 2017; Sasaki 2012; Tsuya 2018), but the results 
linking women’s employment status and marriage have been mixed. Some (Fukuda 
2007; Sasaki 2012) argue that the stability of women’s employment may have been 
more important for marital union than in the past because women have increasingly 
been expected to contribute to family fi nances in response to the deterioration in 
the labour market. Indeed, in 1992, 30.4 percent of unmarried men wanted their 
potential partner to be a housewife but this fi gure had dropped to 10.1 percent by 
2015. Similarly, while 10.8 percent of unmarried men wanted their potential part-
ner to continue to work during the transition to parenthood in 1992, the fi gure had 
jumped to 33.9 percent by 2015 (NIPSSR 2016). In contrast, the fi ndings from the 
present study suggest that neither women’s income nor stable employment neces-
sarily increase marriageability, even among those who married in more recent years 
compared with samples in past studies.
These explicit gender differences in the fi ndings contradict what has been ob-
served in contemporary Europe and North America, where a trend towards gender 
convergence in the effects of employment and earnings on marriage has been iden-
tifi ed (Burstein 2007; Kuo/Raley 2016; Schneider et al. 2019; Shafer/James 2013). 
This discrepancy could be attributed to the ambivalence towards gender equality in 
Japanese society. As is the case in Western countries, the last 50 years have seen 
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gender ideology become more egalitarian, with more and more Japanese believing 
that men and women should be treated equally. Even so, beliefs about the impor-
tance of women’s employment outside of the home was an exception, possibly be-
cause of the symbolic value of the housewife role as well as social and institutional 
constraints on married women’s full participation in the labour market (Lee et al. 
2010). Changes in the roles of men and women in the home are much slower than 
socio-economic development in Japan (Raymo et al. 2015). According to the Inter-
national Social Survey Programme (2012), a majority of Japanese men and women 
agree that being a housewife is as fulfi lling as working for pay whereas the opposite 
is true for most European countries. Lee et al. (2010) mentions that the role of the 
housewife in Japan may not be viewed as oppressive and may have a different sig-
nifi cance than in many Western countries. Firm norms of intensive maternal invest-
ment in the family persist, together with traditions of intergenerational exchange of 
support, sometimes by living together with own parents or in-laws. Such strong ex-
pectations and obligations for mothers are likely to be seen as unattractive to Japa-
nese women who have more life options outside of the family (Bumpass et al. 2009). 
Social and economic sanctions against married women’s full-time employment 
also encouraged the gendered division of labour, while the basic principle of ensur-
ing gender equality has been advocated. By limiting a wife’s annual income, she will 
be exempt from having to pay resident tax and income tax, pension premiums and 
health insurance premiums, and her husband can receive a stepwise tax deduction 
in stages if his wife is a dependent. Consequently, many women often give up their 
regular job once they give birth to their fi rst child because diffi culties they face in 
reconciling work and family life become more of a burden rather than a form of lib-
eration. Considering the low career mobility in employment, it is extremely diffi cult 
for women to pursue a career with promotion opportunities. All of the above make 
Japan a country with one of the largest wage gaps by gender as well as the smallest 
share of female managerial positions in developed countries (OECD 2017).
Although more Japanese men and women believe that women should continue 
to work during the transition to parenthood in order to share the role of provider 
(NIPSSR 2016), social and institutional barriers prevent such lifestyles. In that con-
text, women, regardless of their economic resources, are likely to seek a husband 
who has a stable job with a high level of income because Japanese women can 
clearly see the glass ceiling. Thus, the fi ndings from the present study suggest that 
gender gaps in the family and the workplace have a strong impact on mate selection 
in Japan. 
4.1 Limitations and challenges to the future
This paper has clarifi ed that non-regular employment and low income in recent 
years have reduced the likelihood of fi rst marriage for young people. However, the 
unmarried rate and fertility rate in Japan vary widely from region to region. For ex-
ample, although income levels are highest in Tokyo and lowest in Okinawa, these 
two prefectures have among the highest lifetime unmarried rates in Japan. There-
fore, the effects of employment conditions on marriage may vary from region to re-
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gion. Data limitations prevented us from exploring regional difference in this study, 
but future studies should consider how regional factors infl uence the way in which 
employment affects marriage.
Further study is required in order to clarify whether the employment deteriora-
tion hypothesis applies to other countries. Matsuda (2019) analysed the relationship 
between employment status and marriage using cross-sectional data from Japan, 
South Korea, Singapore, and three European countries. Although the causal rela-
tionship between variables is ambiguous due to restrictions on the data used, mar-
riage probability is affected by employment status and income level in South Korea 
and Singapore, as it is in Japan. Further work is required to establish the validity of 
the employment deterioration hypothesis by using longitudinal data with more de-
tailed working conditions, such as working schedules, fringe benefi ts, and various 
welfare benefi ts for employees. Moreover, the effects of macro-level composition 
in employment status should be compared cross-nationally. If differences in the ef-
fects of working conditions on marriage becomes clear, it will be possible to provide 
policy suggestions for governments in other countries so they can take effective 
measures against their low fertility.
Finally, the effects of precarious employment and low incomes not only reduce 
the likelihood of young adults’ marrying but might also reduce the number of chil-
dren they have. In future, we will study the impact of early employment on the over-
all declining unmarried and birth rates.
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